This scenario makes it difficult for citizens to assume responsibility for their environments and constitutes an obstacle to ecological citizenship.
In the face of this, it has been argued that the promotion of ecological citizenship should be approached together with the ecological transformation of the state (Barry, 2006 (Barry, , 1999 Eckersley, 2004; Christoff, 1996 Christoff, , 2005 . This position is consistent with the evolution in attitudes towards the state that has taken place within green political theory over the past twenty years.
Although greens long held a conception of the state as being inherently authoritarian and responsible for the unsustainable socio-political reality, today there is wide consensus that rejecting the state would limit the options available in the quest for the environment (Paterson et. al., 2006; Barry and Eckersley, 2005c; Eckersley, 2004; Hailwood, 2004; Barry, 1999) . As a consequence, anti-statist ideas have been diluted inside less radical approaches 1 . The result has been a clear concern of green political theorists in establishing the concept of the green state.
The statist turn has had some implications for ecological citizenship and its promotion.
Sherilyn MacGregor notes that it is within the anarchist and anti-authoritarian traditions of green political thought that one finds "the longest-standing approaches to green citizenship, which favour political decentralisation and direct face-to-face democracy at the local or community level " (2006a: 86) . This view is exemplified by Murray Bookchin (1982 Bookchin ( , 1980 who, opposing the state, defends a citizen politics based on a direct democracy in self-managed, co-operative communities.
From the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, green writings on citizenship give more importance to the issue of institutionalisation. Attention has shifted towards the formal rights of the ecological citizen and the mechanisms for citizen participation in environmental deliberation and policy-making processes. In this picture, ecological citizenship is specifically tied to the reform of the state along green lines. The early writings of John Barry (1999) and Peter Christoff (1996) serve well to illustrate the transition towards a trend that has its most clear expression in the work of Robyn Eckersley (2004) .
The notion of the ecological state is grounded on new values, functions, decision rules, and forms of participation and representation. Ecological citizenship would be one of its core institutions. Just as a liberal state promotes liberal citizenship, green theorists of the state contend that an eco-state would use its resources to encourage ecological citizenship as one of the essential components of the sustainable society (Barry, 2006 (Barry, , 1999 Eckersley, 2004; Christoff, 1996) . From this angle, the underlying assumption is that ecological citizens need ecological
states.
Yet, at the same time, ecological citizens are regarded the main actors in the process of greening state institutions. For environmental statists, the move towards ecological states requires the active involvement of green movements and ecological citizens acting together to trigger changes within state institutions, societies and the economy (Barry, 2006; Eckersley, 2004; Dryzek et. al., 2003) . Political innovation in the history of Western modern states begins with social movements and the fact that they could attach their respective defining interests to an incipient state imperative 2 . If environmental values were to be linked with both legitimation and economic imperatives, a green state with an environmental conservation imperative could be established (Hunold and Dryzek, 2005; Dryzek et. al., 2003) . These ideas highlight that ecological citizens and groups are the architects of the reforms that will culminate in green states.
2 State imperatives are "the functions that governmental structures have to carry out to ensure their own longevity and stability" (Dryzek et. al., 2003: 12) . They exist independently of public officials' will and override their preferences in case of conflict. These imperatives are five: domestic order, survival, revenue, economic, and legitimation imperatives (Dryzek et. al., 2003: 12; Dryzek, 2000: 83) .
According to environmental state theorists and some ecological citizenship commentators, it appears then that ecological citizenship is both a precondition for the rise of green states and a key element to sustain them.
The above arguments illustrate a common position within green political theory: that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the consolidation of green states and the articulation of ecological citizenship. Too often some environmental thinkers assume that an ecostate will implement the conditions needed to strengthen ecological citizenship (which, in turn, will help maintain the green state itself). This stance is premised on two ideas: first, that a more participatory and reflexive model of democracy, deliberative democracy, will lead to sustainable outcomes, and, among these, an environmentally enlightened citizenry; second, that ecological modernisation will tame capitalism and, with this, some obstacles to ecological citizenship will be removed. The present contribution challenges this theoretical position (and the two premises it rests upon) not only because it constitutes circular reasoning but mainly because it is a form of wishful thinking. My purpose is to suggest instead that ecological citizenship and the green state do not need each other and, what is more, that a green state may be detrimental for the practice of ecological citizenship. With this, I also intend to question a trend in green political theory which views the state as a solution, and no longer as a problem, and therefore as a privileged actor in environmental politics. I find this to be a very optimistic perspective, a pragmatic posture, grounded on the premise that states are the "basic building blocks of the global order" (Opello and Rosow, 2004: 2) 3 . Yet this paper does not dive into the reasons explaining the pragmatiststatist turn in green politics, nor does it seek to reject or counteract those arguments. Rather, my intention is to confront the assumptions that a green state will be more conducive to ecological citizenship and that it is possible to reform the state along green lines within a capitalist economy. The critique of capitalism connects the two aspects of my argumentation, since my position is informed by the view that both ecological citizenship and environmental politics require opposition to capitalist relations.
The article proceeds as follows: on one front, I examine the concept of an ideal ecological state in view of assessing the ways in which it could encourage ecological citizenship. I identify a narrow focus on deliberative democracy and the political arena conceived in strict or traditional terms, and suggest that a broader perspective is needed. On a second front, I pay attention to how eco-states are going to emerge and be sustained, and the obstacles they may encounter. This theoretical analysis helps me to question the view that a green state informed by ecological modernisation will be able to create the adequate conditions for the promotion of ecological citizenship, as some scholars assume too easily.
Conceptions of the green state and ecological citizenship
As Frank Fischer notes, " [d] emocratic participation has been a central theme in discussions of the ecological state from the outset of the environmental movement" (2013: 2).
Work by a number of scholars has extended this view (Barry, 2006 (Barry, , 1999 Christoff, 2005 Christoff, , 1996 Dryzek et. al., 2003; Eckersley, 2004; Barry and Eckersley, 2005c) . It is based on the estimation that a green state will steer society towards environmental sustainability and enhance participatory democratic processes (often of a deliberative kind) that will shape (ecological) citizenship transformation. Environmental democracy and citizenship commitment to the formulation and delivery of public policy appear as an alternative to technocratic policy-making (Fischer, 2013; Skelcher, 2010) . The idea of a green state is built upon this premise. Before embarking on this task, I offer a summary of the essential aspects of Eckersley's conception, as this will inform my analysis in the rest of the article. Although it is a comprehensive theory which covers a wide range of topics, I will present an oversimplified account that focuses only on those elements that I find most relevant to my own purposes.
The green state is, first and foremost, a democratic and constitutional state. It is governed by a "green constitution" that instantiates an "ecological democracy", and grants a series of environmental substantive and procedural rights to citizens. Second, the green state is a transnational body that has developed its sovereignty and identity beyond its own borders, and assumes responsibility for citizens of other states whenever there are common, transboundary ecological problems. Third, it is not a neutral organisation but an "ethical and democratically responsible state" (Eckersley, 2004: 12) , informed by "ecologically responsible statehood" (Eckersley, 2004: 228) . Fourth, the green state assumes a new rationale and new competences to achieve communicative, social and environmental justice.
The main objective and one of the key functions of the green state is the articulation of an ecological democracy that renders the implementation of ecological citizenship possible.
Ecological democracy is conceived as a deliberative democracy with a distinctively normative and ecological content -which results from the incorporation of environmental justice within communicative justice. Consequently, it has an expanded community of justice defined as the "affected community" or "community at risk". What gives rise to the political and moral community of citizens is a "common ecological embeddedness" and the "common capacity to suffer serious ecological or biological harm" (Eckersley, 2004: 196 (Fishkin, 2009; Gastin and Levine, 2005 facilitate strong ecological modernisation and to institutionalise environmental justice, as they lack the free communicative framework that would enable the adoption of fair and unconstrained economic decisions. Therefore, liberal democracy should give way to an ecological and deliberative democracy that better suits the rationale of the green state. When reading Eckersley's work, it is clear that the transition to ecological democracy appears as a requisite for the implementation of reflexive ecological modernisation which, in turn, is a condition sine qua non for the genesis of a green state.
For changes in economic policy and democratic innovation to result in green states, they have to be reinforced by public debates about the conditions for ecological sustainability and how these may be incorporated into new state functions and roles. This debate, which aims to replace liberal democracy with ecological democracy, is to be initiated by civil society actors in the public sphere. Green movement organisations and ecological citizens have to create a multiplicity of green public spheres while, at the same time, using the party system to influence the conventional locus of politics. Hence the green constitution, ecological democracy, civil society and ecological modernisation are all complementary elements; they constitute a "virtuous circle of change" that will not take place without a dynamic green public sphere (Eckersley, 2004: 246) 4 .
In short, placed within Eckersley's theory of the green state, ecological citizenship is a means to achieve ecological democracy. Ecological citizens are to foster the reforms that will further democratise the state and culminate in the adoption of a green constitution. They have to strengthen the green public sphere, exercise their transboundary rights and make sure that adequate deliberative mechanisms are implemented. Eckersley's view, shared by other supporters of the green state as mentioned in the introduction, is that the success of the green state depends, to a large extent, on the degree to which citizens accept and commit to the new procedures of ecological democracy. The remaining sections of the manuscript show why this position is problematic.
Assessing the potential of green states as facilitators of ecological citizenship
My analysis proceeds with a critical examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the green state-ecological citizenship nexus described in the previous section. Two issues become most relevant in this debate. One is the fact that an ecological democracy is a deliberative democracy. This democratic model offers the right setting for a deliberative understanding of citizenship and environmental issues, in contrast to aggregative conceptions. The second aspect relates to the normative or specifically environmental dimension of this particular notion of democracy, which institutionalises ecological citizenship responsibility. In what follows, I shall further elaborate these points.
Ecological citizens' main duty consists of the reduction of one's ecological footprint (Dobson, 2003) . But the exact implication of this general mandate, what it means for each of us, living in different but interconnected societies, is a matter of conflict. Environmental knowledge can be produced and passed on to citizens via a top-down approach, as in some forms of statesponsored deliberative initiatives, where the process of attitude formation and expression among citizens is determined by the chosen deliberative institution, the formal set-up of the procedure, the selection of questions for discussion (which takes place prior to the debate itself), and the experts invited to participate (whose information and technical judgments become more relevant than lay citizens' values and beliefs) (Aasen and Vatn, 2013; Drevensek, 2005; MacGregor and Szerszynski, 2003) . Or rather, knowledge may be generated by citizens themselves through less guided and more spontaneous deliberation, reflecting in the course of political debate on one's place in the world and the use of resources each of us makes. Citizens also need to learn the virtues related to acting according to justice-based motivations and taking into account the interests of others (Connelly, 2006) . From this perspective, ecological citizenship is a learning process about its own meaning. It is deliberative democracy's educative potential that makes it appropriate for the cultivation of ecological citizenship.
Deliberative democracy can be described as "the practice of public reasoning", in which "participants make proposals, attempt to persuade others, and determine the best outcomes and policies based on the arguments and reasons fleshed out in public discourse" (Schlosberg et. al., 2006: 216) . According to liberal democratic theory, the role of democracy should be the aggregation of individual pre-given preferences into a collective choice, therefore "contemporary liberal institutions are not designed to encourage engagement and the testing of preferences and value orientations" (Smith, 2003: 55) . In this respect, deliberative democracy is different in that "preferences and interests are not brought into the conversation as in a battle -with one person or group wining and others losing" (Scholsberg et. al, 2006: 216) . Ideally, when citizens take part in democratic debate, they are open and ready to have their preferences and values changed. This happens by virtue of the force of the better argument, and not due to external motivation -as it occurs when policy tools like regulation and monetary incentives are used to encourage proenvironmental attitudes.
Within deliberative structures citizens' views are not assumed as self-evident. Instead, the institutions and contexts where these are formed are taken into consideration. Citizens' actions are molded by the wider institutions, and this restriction can be an obstacle to the practice of ecological citizenship. A deliberative framework challenges the assumption that all citizens have the same opportunities to choose to act as ecological citizens. Time, knowledge, information, wealth and gender relations can sometimes be barriers to ecological citizenship (MacGregor, 2006a (MacGregor, , 2006b Luque, 2005; Seyfang, 2005) . These limitations can be made visible in a deliberative setting. From this point of view, through the implementation of a deliberative democracy, the green state would be both removing obstacles to ecological citizenship and facilitating the internalisation of ecological citizenship motivations for action.
Advocates of deliberative democracy contend that communicative politics are likely to increase the effectiveness, sustainability and legitimacy of decisions. On the one hand, enhanced citizen participation shall lead to more democratic and authentic outcomes; this would generate more legitimate environmental politics and policy (Warren, 2007; Baber and Barlett, 2005; Scholsberg et. al, 2006; Smith, 2003; Dryzek, 2000; Fischer, 2000) . On the other hand, the normative indeterminacy, epistemological uncertainty and complexity of socio-environmental issues indicate that the sustainable society has to be built upon a dialogue between different points of view. The dividing line between science and politics, and between facts and values, is no longer clear-cut. Participatory science methods, like "post-normal science", make us rethink the connection between scientific expertise and policy-making in the management of environmental-technological problems (Farrell, 2011a (Farrell, , 2011b ).
Deliberative democracy is said to have the ability to democratise the making of environmental information: scientific knowledge can be complemented with other types of knowledge, giving rise to new forms of collaborative expertise, namely community-based research, participatory science, or extended peer review processes (Fischer, 2013 (Fischer, , 2000 Farrell, 2011a Farrell, , 2011b . These methods give authority to people to speak about complex issues of their concern, issues that would have otherwise been considered as technical and excluded from public debate. This can help prevent situations where a politically unjust or scientifically dubious view is being advanced (Farrell, 2011b) . Besides, as Barry argues, "communicative rationality makes it less likely that the collective result will be ecologically irrational", since democracy conceived as communication "provides some evidence that individuals can deliver enhanced environmental public goods and avoid or limit environmental public bads " (1999: 230 specifically on deliberative democracy, the conclusion is similar: there is no definitive evidence that debate and participation will produce changes in values, preferences and behaviors or bring about sustainable and risk-averse policies, as noted by many scholars (Backstrand et. al, 2010; Baber and Barlett, 2005; Smith, 2003; Fischer, 2000) . Deliberation has the potential to produce the transformation of non-ecological preferences through debate, but it cannot guarantee per se a better quality of social-environmental decisions. In fact, it can also lead to unsustainable and unfair arrangements. Nevertheless a discursive environment provides space for different conceptions of sustainable development to emerge and be compared by citizens. So even if the assumption that deliberative democracy will deliver environmental ends is just this, an assumption, it could still be argued that the openness and inclusiveness of the communication process would be a good platform to develop ecological citizenship. . There is some evidence that the experience of getting involved in the creation of this infrastructure contributes to ecological citizenship learning, and not just the other way round (Hards, 2011; Travaline and Hunold, 2010; Horton, 2006; Seyfang, 2009 Seyfang, , 2005 Smith, 2005; Phillips, 2005; Reid and Taylor, 2000) . Put differently, the claim that knowledge or values are a precondition for practice or behavior does not always hold. The values-action connection is bi-directional and complex 5 My position contrasts, for instance, with that of Rasmus Karlsson (2012) , who argues that ecological citizenship does not necessarily require a reduction in consumption rates or any cuts in material welfare, as it aims at a future of universal affluence and natural restoration. For him, ecological citizens should favour new technologies that enable solutions like moving industrial production off the planet in order to reduce our carbon footprint. 6 The two dimensions of ecological citizenship are not exclusive but do complement each other. Debate can focus on alternative human-nature systems. And, at the same time, socio-economic institutions can be the arenas where citizens learn the skills needed to participate in deliberative processes, as Smith (2005) suggests with particular reference to the organisations of the social economy. (Hards, 2011) . In some cases, social learning about environmental issues results from "hands-on participation" (Travaline and Hunold, 2010) , that is, from the experience of getting involved in practices like urban agriculture projects (Travaline and Hunold, 2010) , seed saving networks (Philips, 2005) , organisations within the social economy (Smith, 2005) , food supply chains and non-market exchange mechanisms such as community currencies (Seyfang, 2009; 7 .
Engagement in these areas raises awareness of issues concerning citizens' daily lives and contributes to ecological citizenship. Through participation in practices that create alternative realities within which it is possible to live differently, the boundaries of what counts as political action are constantly redefined (Phillips, 2005) and ecological citizenship transformation takes place, as knowledge, motivation and skills are gained as a result of lived experience (and not just as a result of discussion, as it happens in discursive accounts of ecological citizenship).
As this section should have outlined, a green state that grounds the promotion of ecological citizenship on participation in deliberative democratic processes neglects other important dimensions of ecological citizenship and domains where it can be practiced. This is the first point of my critique of Eckersley's theory of the green state.
The disturbing effects of capitalism
So far we have established that the green state has a strong potential to develop ecological citizenship, albeit with a rather narrow focus on its deliberative dimension. However, recalling the ideas about how a green state is to emerge, it is my intention to argue that this potential may not be fully realised. The apparently productive relationship between ecological citizenship, 7 I am not claiming that these initiatives always lead to environmental knowledge acquisition and produce those shifts in values associated with ecological citizenship. What I seek to argue here is that they have the potential to facilitate the promotion of ecological citizenship outside the political arena of deliberative processes, in other domains of life.
ecological democracy and the green state may be disrupted by the entry of capitalism into the picture. A green state will emerge from a reform of liberal democratic institutions and procedures. Such reform accepts, rather than rejects, what are considered to be the positive achievements of liberalism so that they can be shaped in an ecological direction. Similarly, a green state adopts ecological modernisation, which is based on the idea that economic growth and sustainability can be made compatible, thus being a revised version of capitalism. And this (a postliberal ecological democracy and an ecologically modernised economy) may be an obstacle
for the values and objectives of the green state -promising for the promotion of ecological citizenship -to unfold
I. Capitalism and (post)liberal democracy
In order to further elaborate these claims, let me start with democracy (and then I will concentrate on ecological modernisation). To assist me in this task, John Dryzek's analysis of different deliberative democratic models is insightful. Dryzek alludes to a constitutionalist trend that seeks to instantiate deliberative processes within liberal democratic institutions. This position manifests itself in at least three different -but compatible -approaches. The first one consists in using deliberative democracy's guiding principles to justify the existence of individual rights, particularly those rights needed for the exercise of democratic citizenship, and thus required to sustain deliberative democracy itself. A second perspective seeks to use liberal constitutions to create a public space for deliberation. In this view, constitutions should prescribe that one of the new functions and goals for the state is to promote deliberative democracy, and establish new rules and mechanisms that consolidate deliberation. Finally, the constitution itself can be made through a deliberative process (Dryzek, 2000: 10-17; Dryzek, 1994: 190) .
It is now appropriate to reintroduce Eckersley's conception of deliberative ecological democracy to make a few remarks. First, the use of constitutional provisions to secure political communication and implement ecological democracy defines, as we have seen, Eckersley's theory of the green state. The constitution establishes the state's responsibilities, functions and objectives. And one of these objectives is precisely to facilitate ecological democracy. Second, deliberative democracy is used to justify rights of participation and political equality, that is, those rights conceived as a precondition to maintain deliberative democracy itself. In other words, the rights and obligations of ecological citizens are defined in deliberative terms: they are realised within the deliberative process and aim at articulating ecological democracy. So the constitution (also made through a deliberative process) is used to implement deliberative mechanisms and ecological citizenship rights that make a green and deliberative democracy possible. This approach, I suggest, shows a certain similarity to the constitutionalist trend mentioned above.
If we believe Dryzek, then attempts to implement deliberative democracy through constitutional means may result in the assimilation of deliberative democracy by liberalism. In a capitalist economy, the health of liberal democracy relies on economic growth so that social and political inequalities remain hidden. If inequalities become more visible, social instability arises and threatens the very existence of liberal democracy. The fear of this scenario renders liberal democracies "imprisoned by the market's growth imperative" (Dryzek, 1994: 180 (Dryzek, 2000: 55) , and both civil society and the public sphere have a liberal reading in the history of political thought (Habermas, 1996 (Habermas, , 1989 Calhoun, 1992; Fraser, 1992) . In fact, scholars of deliberative constitutionalism believe that one of the main purposes of the constitution is to establish the necessary means for a public sphere for debate to be maintained (Dryzek, 2000) .
So if the presence and inclusion of civil society and the public sphere are not enough for deliberative democracy to be critical, and to address the shortcomings of liberal democracy, what else is needed? For deliberative democracy not to be undermined by state imperatives, it should be located in oppositional public spheres. According to Dryzek, the public sphere has to remain autonomous, so that there is a sharp distinction between the public sphere and the state. Opinion should move from the public sphere toward the state, but not the other way round. Discourses can and should affect public policy. However, the public sphere where such discourses are generated should be separated from the state, to avoid discourses being assimilated (which is different from discourses having an impact on state policy). As a result, political activity in civil society must seek the "democratic exercise of power over the state", while being vigilant to avoid "the inclusion of civil society within the state" (Dryzek, 2000: 102-103 ).
Eckersley's account of ecological democracy is also oppositional and critical of capitalist relations. In fact, one of the features of her notion of democracy is the use of political institutions to control capitalism, and make it fairer and sustainable -assuming that this is possible and hence neglecting the idea of the "relative autonomy" of the state (Poulantzas, 1978 (Poulantzas, , 1973 . So the adoption of reflexive ecological modernisation depends on the further ecological democratisation of states. And ecological democratisation, in turn, relies on ecological citizens' commitment. But insofar as this democratic model departs from liberal institutions, those further steps -reflexive ecological modernisation -that will lead to controlling capitalism may not be taken. Before this is accomplished, the emancipatory potential of deliberation may be neutralised. I now turn to explain how this may occur.
A dual commitment to reforming the liberal state and strengthening civil society and the public sphere is found in Eckersley's work. Despite the emphasis on the state and its formal institutions, we see a significant effort on her part to locate deliberative settings and ecological citizenship also in the public sphere. Indeed, she argues that without ecological citizens maintaining a vibrant public sphere ecological democracy is not likely to survive, since one of the preconditions of ecological democracy is a new "ecological sensibility" (Eckersley, 2004: 245) produced as a result of a cultural shift. And this cultural shift can only take place in the public sphere. For this reason, if a deliberative ecological state is to emerge, the constitution, although necessary, is not enough.
However, in Eckersley's theory, it is the state and the constitution that are entrusted with the promotion of ecological democracy, citizenship and the public sphere through mechanisms that seek to secure the availability of information about risk-generating activities, citizens' participation in deliberations and access to environmental justice. So, in this account, the public sphere where deliberative democracy and the learning of ecological citizenship take place, is part of the state and it is encouraged by the state itself, lacking the sort of autonomy needed to retain its critical force. If the public sphere is included within the state, it is likely to be eroded and lose its vitality and oppositional nature. Such a view of the public sphere may result in the co-option of ecological democracy by the liberal state. What is more, insofar as ecological democracy is placed within a theory of the state and institutionalised by constitutional means, is at risk of being assimilated by the liberal state, and thus not lead to the kinds of transformations needed to originate a green state.
In light of Dryzek's typology of different state-civil society relations (Dryzek, 2000; Dryzek et. al., 2003) , a civil society with a myriad of contested discourses will be more likely to be maintained when interacting with an "exclusive" state, since an "inclusive" state can absorb and erode diversity. A deliberative green state is inclusive, open and receptive to civil society and ecological citizenship deliberations, to the extent that the state acts as a facilitator of such deliberations, making information available, implementing the mechanisms for citizen participation, and acting as a coordinator of deliberation that takes place in both spaces -state and civil society 9 . A green state that incorporates civil society into its own political and constitutional structures would absorb civil society, not in the same way as authoritarian states do, but in a way that may compromise its confrontational powers and ability to change the present order.
II.Capitalism and ecological modernisation
In brief, the green state's potential to facilitate ecological citizenship is compromised because ecological democracy shall be undermined by state imperatives, particularly by the accumulation imperative. Neo-Marxist analyses of Jürgen Habermas (1976) and Claus Offe (1975 , 1984 This view is generally shared by theorists of the ecological state, for instance, Christoff (2005) and Meadowcroft (2005a) , who would see the kind of objections outlined in Dryzek's analysis of state-economy relations -earlier summarised -as rather anachronistic or outdated. But, can strong ecological modernisation help overcoming these criticisms? Is ecological modernisation a true way out of the contradictions of capitalism?
First, it should be noted that a green state committed to strong ecological modernisation does not avoid criticisms levied at weak ecological modernisation's stress on production and techno-fixes. As Stewart Davidson (2012) 51). On the other hand, she concedes that ecological modernisation is a way to reconcile capitalism and the economic growth imperative with environmental protection. In fact, we are told that ecological modernisation is a strategy for the competition state to adapt itself to demands of greater competitiveness by global markets and neoliberalism (Eckersley, 2004: 69) .
Thus, if ecological modernisation does not replace capitalism but offers a way to accommodate the sustainable development discourse within a capitalist system, it can be argued that the green state is still a capitalist state, despite Eckersley's assertion that "a deep and lasting resolution to ecological problems can…only be anticipated in a postcapitalist economy… " (2004: 81) . This is There is another important point in relation to this paper's topic: since the green state relies on technological innovation and the production of clean technologies that enable environmentally friendly consumer choices, it may be promoting a green form of consumerism rather than ecological citizenship based on practices that question consumer rates. As Davidson The argument I wish to advance is that a green state characterised by the implementation of an ecological democracy and ecological modernisation cannot counterbalance the pitfalls of liberal democracy and capitalism, and thus, it is not the most appropriate locus for the cultivation of ecological citizenship. This suggests that we should focus on other spaces such as the community, the workplace or transnational civil society where anti-capitalistic strategies may be pursued, and where the seed for the cultivation of ecological democracy and citizenship may better flourish. In this sense Dryzek's ideas, once more, may be useful (although he is more welcoming of the state and of discursive notions of citizenship and politics than the position I seek to defend in this manuscript).
In contrast to Eckersley's approach, Dryzek (2000) believes that coordination of political transformation could be entrusted to spontaneous networks in civil society. This spontaneous system is similar to the way international organisations and movements operate. Nevertheless, even though civil society should be self-governing, this does not mean that it can be completely separate from the state. State activities and regulations penetrate civil society and shape cultural, social and economic relations -just as civil society activities sometimes target the state and influence its policy. Yet civil society can be the source of legitimate and binding decisions, even if these do not emanate from state bodies. These decisions can be implemented and put into practice without being further institutionalised by the state. This is a form of "paragovernmental activity" (Dryzek, 2000: 102) , which goes beyond seeking to affect state policy, and leads to what Iris Young (2000) defines as "intra-society change" because it transforms social organisation directly.
Conclusion
The prospects for ecological citizenship transformation within the structures of a green state are encouraging. In a deliberative green state, ecological citizenship is a constitutional mandate and is to be enacted in the context of an ecological democracy. Citizens' environmental responsibility is expressed through democratic participation. The idea of a framework for ecological citizenship activity that gives coherence to isolated ecological citizenship acts (much needed if we want to avoid that ecological citizenship becomes a moralistic and depoliticised road to sustainability, as I argue elsewhere [Author, 2008] ) is present here: the whole machinery of the state is put to the service of environmental and social justice.
A deliberative ecological democracy implemented by a green state is likely to offer more possibilities for the promotion of ecological citizenship than an aggregative liberal democracy, since a deliberative framework acknowledges the process of formation and transformation of citizens' values, preferences and motivations to act, as well as the structures that constrain citizens' choices. Moreover, the ecological dimension of this view of deliberative democracy, which renders possible the inclusion of traditionally excluded groups, is central to the promotion of ecological citizenship. Ecological citizens acknowledge how their decisions and acts impact on others and on the environment. Hence a state whose political system is an ecological democracy inclusive of groups ruled out of conventional policy processes, will be using its institutions to facilitate ecological citizenship. of inclusive states that facilitate deliberation in the public sphere and the incorporation of public opinion into policy (Dryzek et. al., 2003) , where there is less democratic vitality and more social homogenisation. Davidson (2012) rightly notes that both theories of strong ecological modernisation and the green state assume that the legitimation imperative will counterbalance the accumulation imperative. In Eckersley's account, this means that ecological modernisation depends on the ecological democratisation of societies, as I mentioned earlier. However, this paper has argued that Eckersley's notion of the green state does not avoid the problems arising from the relationship between liberal democracy and capitalism. Since the articulation of an eco-state constitutes a process that originates within liberal democratic institutions and within capitalistic relations, the possibilities for ecological democracy shall be inhibited before this is implemented and before the mechanisms for reflexive ecological modernisation are put in place. If the state depends on wealth generated by private capital accumulation, its capacity to pass legislation that does not guarantee the continuity of the process of accumulation is undermined. And, by the same token, its ability to enact an ecological democracy (which would provide the free communicative context where the socio-environmental impact of capitalism and neoliberal creeds can be exposed) would be compromised. This would not only render difficult the task of creating a green state guided by ecological values, but constitute an obstacle to ecological citizenship.
